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ESSAY

"[H]E SHOULD AT HIS PERIL KEEP IT
THERE.. .- :1 HOW THE COMMON LAW TELLS US
THAT RISK BASED CORRECTIVE

ACTION IS WRONG
Victor B. Flatt*
"[Rylands v. Fletche] represents a conviction of what is right and
proper so persistent as to become traditional and almost instinctive, a
2
very part of the inner consciousness of the race."
INTRODUCTION

First tentatively in small administrative decisions and now with
louder fury in proposals for legislation and wholesale administrative
changes, "Risk Based Corrective Action" (RBCA or "Rebecca") (a way
of using risk analysis to make risk management decisions by balancing
benefits and costs) is a theory of environmental management gaining
many adherents. Although benefit-cost analysis is traditionally used in
3
public administration (indeed, by executive order in many cases), it
has heretofore not been used in the administration of all environmen1 Rylands v. Fletcher, 3 L.R.-E. & I. App. 330, 340 (H.L 1868).
* Associate Professor of Law, Georgia State University. BA. Vanderbilt

University, 1985; J.D. Northwestern University, 1988. The Author vishes to
acknowledge the research assistance provided by the Georgia State University College

of Law, the Georgia State University supplemental research funding, and the editorial
staff of the NotreDameLaw Review. Special thanks to Carol Rose, Daniel Farber, Alison
Fournoy, Julian Juergensmeyer, the "faculty brown bag group" at GSU's College of
Law for comments on this Essay at various stages, and a very special thanks to Amy
Major andJamie McMahon for their expert research activities.
2 Francis H. Bohlen, The Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher, 59 U. PA. L Rxv. 298, 303
(1911).
3 President Jimmy Carter ordered cost-benefit anal sis for executive branch
agencies, where not prohibited, in 1978 in Exec. Order No. 12,044, 43 Fed. Reg.
12,661, 12,663 (Mar. 23, 1978). Similar directives were issued by presidents Reagan,
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tal laws. 4 Indeed, it has been explicitly prohibited in many cases.5
However, industry and some academics and politicians have hailed
the use of risk analysis, and the comparison of risk with benefits of risk

management for the purposes of administration, as a way to lower
costs of environmental regulation without losing anything in the process. 6 Even the name sounds pleasant-"Rebecca" as in Sunnybrook
Farm.7 However, this Rebecca is not necessarily benign, and its impact is more far-reaching than has yet been explored. Although there
have been critiques and studies of problems in using benefit-cost analysis to make risk management administrative and policy determinations, 8 most of these have addressed the problems in acknowledging
which values to consider and the problems with the calculation of
risks and benefits or costs. 9 These are certainly important considerations, but they also leave open the possibility that, if technical
problems are overcome, Rebecca would be a useful and efficient administrative and legislative policy tool.10 This is simply not true in all
cases.
Far more important are those critiques that focus on the moral
and ethical problems of allowing environmental risks to fall involuntarily on innocent people." As several articles have noted, the use of
benefit-cost analysis (which is the basis of Rebecca) in environmental
regulation may not correctly value the social or ethical implications of
Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 17, 1981), and Clinton, Exec, Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993).
4 See Victor B. Flatt, Environmental "Contraction"for America? (or Ilow I Stopped
Worrying and Learned to Love the EPA), 29 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 585, 601 (1996).
5 See, e.g., Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1532(19), 1533(b) (2) (1994);
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b) (1) (1994).
6 See Celia Campbell-Mohn &John S. Applegate, Learningfrom NEPA: Guidelines
for Possible Risk Legislation, 23 HARv. ENvm. L. REv. 93, 93-94 (1999) (citing articles).
See generally STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TowARD EFFECTIVE RISK
REGULATION (1993) (promoting benefit-cost analysis as an aid in making administrative decisions).
7 See KATE DoUcLAs SMrrIT WIGGIN, REBECCA OF SUNNYBROOK FAMI (1917).
8 See Campbell-Mohn & Applegate, supra note 6, at 99-102.
9 See id.
10 But see David M. Driesen, The Societal Cost of Environmental Regulation: Beyond
Administrative Cost-Benefit Analysis, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 545, 549-50 (1997) (arguing that
cost-benefit analysis is not really economically beneficial in the long term).

11

See

MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH: PHILOsOPHY, LAW, AND THE

ENVIRONMENT

45-46 (1988); Victor B. Flatt, Should the Circle Be Unbroken?: A Review of

the Hon. Stephen Breyer's Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation, 24
ENVTL. L. 1707, 1717 (1994).
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where risks may fall.12 For instance, the argument for applying benefit-cost balancing to Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-

pensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA)13 cleanup is that the
total cost of the risk to the site's neighbors might be less than the cost

14
of site remediation, but this does not account for who bears the loss.
Those who support Rebecca and benefit-cost analysis in an environmental context have answered that sometimes individuals may sacrifice for the common good and have then pointed to negligence law to
bolster the argument that our common law embraces the doctrine of
everyone giving for the common good. 15 To quote the famousJustice
Holmes:
A man need not, it is true, do this or that act-the term act implies a
choice-but he must act somehow. Furthermore, the public generally profits by individual activity. As action cannot be avoided and
tends to the public good, there is obviously no policy in throwing
the hazard of what is at once desirable and inevitable upon the
16
actor.
However, reasoning from negligence theory and the common law
does not support an introduction of Rebecca policy to emironmental
decisions. A closer examination of the emergence of negligence in
the common law shows that we as a society have not chosen involuntary risk shifting as an appropriate response to societal problems. Although negligence addresses the sharing of costs between plaintiff
and defendant and may allow the risk of loss to fall on plaintiffs in
certain cases, an examination of the struggle between negligence and
strict liability indicates that this is only in proscribed circumstances
and that Rebecca's wholesale shift of entitlements is not supported by

12 See SAoFF, supra note 11, at 46; Flatt, supra note 11, at 1717; see also Driesen,
supra note 10, at 558-59 (stating that benefit-cost analysis has been criticized for,
among other things, assigning a dollar value to human life). Richard L Revesz tackles both the calculation problems in benefit-cost analysis as well as the problems of
inter-generational equity in EnvironmentalRegulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the Discounting of Human Lives, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 941, 944-45 (1999).
13 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994).
14 See BREYER, supra note 6, at 11-12.
15 See Edwvard W. Warren & Gary E. Merchant, "More Good Than Harm": A Frst
Pfinciple for EnvironmentalAgencies and Reviewing Courts, 20 EcoLoc" LQ. 379, 418
(1993); see also Corrosion Proof Fitting v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1222-23 (5th Cir. 1991)
(suggesting that benefit-cost analysis indicates that the EPA's spending over $200 milnot reasonable).
lion to save approximately seven lives over thirteen years w%-as
16 OLuVER WENDELL Holms, THE COMMON LXw 95 (Boston, Brown, Little & Co.
1881).
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the common law but is indeed condemned by it.17 With or without
conscious focus, the judges and justices who forged our common law
through the emergence of negligence and the re-emergence of strict
liability did protect the average person from having safety entitlements
knowingly and deliberately taken away to enrich other parties.
Protection of these rights is a bedrock principle of our society,
and it should not be thrown away lightly. 18 A wholesale embrace of
Rebecca would jettison this principle-something I believe to be far
more dangerous than her proponents or even critics have suggested.
In this Essay, I will describe the universe of risk based corrective
decisions that are currently being adopted or considered at the administrative and congressional levels. Then I will briefly review the
previously identified problems with this method. Finally, I will
demonstrate how Rebecca is unjustified, not only for those reasons,
but for the far more fundamental reason that it works a major change
in how our society has historically approached entitlements to safety
through the common law of torts. Of course, just because Rebecca is
an unprecedented change in societal norms does not mean that we as
a society cannot choose to adopt her. But before the members of the
American public, one and all, embrace their trip to Sunnybrook Farm,
I think we all should know and consider exactly what the trip entails.
I.

WHAT

Is "RISK BASED CoRREcTvE AcTION" AND WHERE IS IT
BEING PROPOSED?

The term "Risk Based Corrective Action" can have many meanings. It has come to be a buzzword in calls for Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) administrative decisions in certain programs,' 9 but
it also reflects a broader concept that is driving both administrative
and legislative decisions. For purposes of this Essay, I describe "Risk
Based Corrective Action" as any policy that stands for the proposition
17 SeeJonathan Bender, SocietalRisk Reduction:Promiseand Pitfalls,3 N.Y.U. ENvit.
L.J. 255, 270 (1994) (asserting that societal risk reduction, that is, using cost-benefit
analysis in environmental administration, would indeed work a change in common
law principles).
18 Accord id. at 266.
19 See American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) Sub Committee on
Storage Tanks, FAQ 6: What is RBCA or "Rebecca," available at http://vw.epa.gov/
OUST/rbdm/rbdmfaq6.htm (last modified May 6, 1999) (describing the Guide for
Risk Based Corrective Action applied at Petroleum Release Sites [E-1739-95]). The
formal definition in the document is as follows: "a streamlined approach in which
exposure and risk assessment practices are integrated with traditional components of
the corrective action process to ensure that appropriate and cost-effective remedies
are selected, and that limited resources are properly allocated." Id.

2001]

RISK BASED CORRECTIVE ACTION

that harm or risk of harm to humans or the environment should be
ameliorated or controlled only to the extent that the measurable benefits of that control outweigh the risk of the harm. For purposes of
discussion, I will use the term "Rebecca" to describe this policy.
The term has not always been used dearly and has been used to
label certain policies that really do not utilize the core Rebecca concept of basing policy decisions on pure benefit-cost analysis. For instance, comparing the costs of different methods of controlling the
same risks is often used in administrative actions by the EPA, but this
use is generally quite limited. It is generally used only as a method of
implementation of "no-risk" statutes; in other words, there could be
situations in which the EPA may determine a particular course of action based on costs, but that theoretically does not alter the legal requirement that no risk to human health (or in some cases the
environment) remain. This is not, strictly speaking, a risk based corrective action because it does not limit cleanup (managing risk) to the
cost of the objective benefits of managing that risk.
For example, under GERCLA, although cleanup levels currently
must be set to protect human health as defined by "appropriate" and
"relevant" health standards, 20 once that level is reached, economic
feasibility may be taken into account 2 1 Thus, though CERCLA requires a feasibility analysis when considering othenvise equivalent
cleanup schemes, the fundamental goal is still risk reduction.22 This is
not a wholesale balancing of total risk versus costs of controlling that
risk. Although individual risk assessments may consider alternative
remedies such as less expensive and thorough cleanups for property
that will continue in industrial usage, this remedy selection must still
meet the stringent standard of keeping human exposure below the
"applicable or relevant and appropriate standard requirement[s]"
that must be used in the remedial investigation.2 Furthermore, assumptions about land usage in such cases must be reasonable in order
24
to ensure that public health is protected as required by statute.
Moreover, CERCLA limits the usage of these so-called exposure controls by expressing a preference for treatment over containment.2 If
20 See 42 U.S.C. § 9621(d)(1) (1994); 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(e)(9), (f)(l)(i)(D)
(1999).

21

See 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(f) (1) (H)(D) (1999).

22 See id
23 42 U.S.C. § 9621(d) (2) (A) (1994).
24 See George Wyeth, Land Use and Cleanups:Beyond the Rhetoric, 26 Evwn L REP.
NEws & ANAL-mss 10,358, 10,359-60 (1996).

25

See 42 U.S.C. § 9621(b)(1) (1994).
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all appropriate values are taken into consideration, 26 this analysis of
the costs of controlling risks at a set level in hazardous waste decisions
is not problematic, because it does not alter the basic policy of protecting human health or the environment, but just represents a
change in how to do it. Instead of reducing the risk by taking it out of
the ground, we will reduce the risk by shielding humans (or the environment) from the risk. Presumably this can be based on some confidence in scientific studies and may be preferred by potentially
27
responsible parties and society because it is cheaper.
Several other environmental regulations utilize technology standards in meeting risk reduction goals that inherently suggest some
form of cost balancing, 28 but these generally are mandated by law and
are not designed to allow for lower costs of control to control lesser
risks.2 9 Instead, they are (or were) considered the closest effective
means of completely controlling a particular environmental harm that
was acknowledged in the statutes3 0 and in which residual risk is theoretically not to be allowed. 3 ' Although the use of technology standards implicates whether health considerations in some way should be
balanced against costs, none of these legislative provisions, even those
that acknowledge remedial risk, use any sort of balancing of costs of
regulations against the expected reduction in risk to create the technology standard. Instead, the technology standard is tied to the feasi-

bility of technical controls, not the amount of risk that these controls
26 See discussion infra Part II.A-B.
27 It could also be preferred by society as a whole, if it speeds cleanups.
28 See Rybachek v. EPA, 904 F.2d 1276, 1289 (9th Cir. 1990) ("From this statutory
language, it is 'plain that as a general rule, the EPA is required to consider the costs
and benefits of a proposed technology in its inquiry to determine the BPT.'" (citadons omitted)).
29 See generally Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (establishing that the technical requirements for "end of pipe" control though water quality
is still taken into consideration); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.G. § 7411 (1994) (listing new
source performance standards); 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d) (1994) (listing technological
controls of hazardous air pollutant sources); 42 U.S.C. § 7521 (1994) (listing mobile
source standards).
30 See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1994) (declaring the Congressional purpose to be the restoration and maintenance of "the chemical, physical, and
biological integrity of the Nation's waters"); see also Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401
(1994) (declaring the Act's purpose to be "to protect and enhance the quality of the
Nation's air resources").
31 See 33 U.S.C. § 1312 (1994) (specifying additional controls if the technological
controls mandated in § 1311 do not adequately protect water quality); 42 U.S.C.
§ 7410 (1994) (establishing health quality standards for the air pollutants that are
regulated with technological requirements in § 7411).
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would eliminate. 32 When considered with the accompanying healthbased standards, these technological standards simply reflect the desire to require some measurable action in controlling pollution and
the infeasibility of setting health standards at a level lower than tech33
nology would allow.

Of course, there is evidence that administrative agencies in fact
have engaged in risk based corrective action, even where it is not allowed.m The agencies understandably have been reticent about engaging in this action in any widespread manner, but there is some

indication that the courts may be moving toward accepting such administrative discretion as allowed under statutes that specify that only
health considerations are to govern the standards. According to an
interpretation by Federico Cheever, in its latest Endangered Species
Act (ESA) cases, the Supreme Court itself has "dropped a few hints
that the lower courts should take a more 'reasonable' [that is, balancing] approach to applying the Endangered Species Act."3 5 Of even
greater concern was the industry appeal to the Supreme Court, and
resulting pressure on the EPA, to allow cost to be a constraining factor
in the delegation of national ambient air quality standards to the

EPA-36

In any event, although the possibility of the EPA using Rebecch
inappropriately in the administration of environmental laws is of concern, it is, at least for now, a legal issue, and one that can be resolved
by challenging such actions if and when they occur. Far more important are the attempts to bring Rebecca policy into our laws themselves,
which would then allow or require Rebecca cost-balancing principles
to be used in the administration of environmental law.
At the legislative level, the policy in environmental statutes of
utilizing cost in remedy selection alone has begun to give way in cer32 See &g., Big Rivers Elec. Corp. v. EPA, 523 F.2d 16, 21 (6th Cir. 1975) (recognizing that infeasibility of technological controls might allow a change in the overall
goal of maximum pollution reduction).
33 See PETER S. MENE.L & RICHARD B. STEWART, EN nomRNsT,%L L, AND Pouc"
237-38 (1994).
34 See MARC K. LANDY -r AL., THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECrION AGENC . ASKING
THE WRONG QuEsTIoNs 65-70 (1990) (describing how benefit-cost considerations

were factored into the EPA's decision to alter the ozone standard from .08 parts per
million (ppm) to .12 ppm).
35 Federico Cheever, Butterflies, Cave Spiders, Milk-Veld, Bundgrass, Sedges, Lilies,
Checker-Mallows and Wy the ProhibitionAgainst JudidalBalandng of Harm Under the Endangered Species Act Is a Good Idea, 22 WM. & MARY ENrt.. L & PoL'v REV. 313, 314
(1998).

36 Linda Greenhouse, Attack on Clean AirAct Faltersin High Court, N.Y. Ti.tEs, Nov.
8, 2000, at Al.
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tain arenas to competing policies that seek to compare costs of managing risks with the supposed benefits of that management. Although
already adopted policies do not represent a wholesale introduction of
Rebecca, they do show a general "creep" toward a paradigm of costbalancing, which could in turn pave the way for Rebecca on a full
scale as seen in proposed legislation. For instance, the Food Quality
Protection Act of 1996 (FQPA),3 7 which amended both the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act 38 and the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act,3 9 requires the EPA to determine combined
risk assessments for agricultural chemicals and compare them to an
"acceptable" level of health risk, as opposed to simply banning all
"cancer-causing" agents or food with cancerous residue. 40 This is
probably not a full-scale implementation of Rebecca, however, as it
can be argued that the FQPA merely reflects a more sophisticated
analysis of cancer risk and not necessarily an abandonment of the desire for total protection of the public. Presumably an "acceptable"
level of health risk is at or near zero. Far more profound are the proposals that would adopt the core Rebecca policy-balancing costs of
control with a limited list of measurable objective benefits-as a major
change to existing environmental statutes.
In 1995, Senator Gorton unveiled Senate Bill 768,4 1 which would
have dramatically rewritten the ESA by, among other things, incorporating benefit-cost analysis. 42 The bill restricted the definition of prohibited "harm" of an endangered species to those actions that directly
result in the injury or death of the animal or plant. 43 Moreover, protections for sub-populations would have been substantially reduced
unless the Secretary of the Interior found that stricter measures were
"in the national interest."44 Further, the bill required federal officials
to consider economic factors and apply cost-benefit analysis to pro37 Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-170, 110 Stat. 1513 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C. and 21 U.S.C.).
38 7 U.S.C. §§ 13 6 -136y (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
39 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-396 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
40 Under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, "unreasonable
adverse effects on the environment" can refer to a human dietary risk resulting from

use of a pesticide that is not inconsistent with 21 U.S.C. § 346 (1994). See 7 U.S.C.

§136(bb) (1994 & Supp. IV1998).
41

Endangered Species Act Reform Act of 1995, S. 768, 104th Cong. § 309 (1995).

42

See Timothy Egan, Industries Affected by Endangered Species Act Help a Senator Re-

write Its Provisions,N.Y. TIMFS, Apr. 13, 1995, at A20.
43 See Government & Commerce: Endangered Species Act, 53 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP.
2640, 2641 (1995).
44 See Tom Kenvorthy, PanelSupports StrongerSpecies Act; Effect of Study on Upcoming
Hill EnvironmentalDebate Seen as Questionable,WAsfi. PosT, May 25, 1995, at A3.

2001]

RISK BASED CORRECTIVE ACTION

posed efforts to protect a species. 4 5 The Secretary of Interior or Commerce, depending on the species in question, would then decide
when, how, and whether to save a species. 46
Specifically, section 309 of the proposed bill, titled "Requiring
Risk Assessment and Cost Benefit Analyses in the Consultation Process," 4 7 would have amended the existing section 7(b) of the ESA 8 by
adding language mandating that the Secretary estimate the costs and
the benefits of any action taken under the ESA.4 9 This amended section would bring cost-consciousness into the equation for conservation of species. 50 Costs to be considered included those "to the
Federal Government, State and local governments, the applicant, and
the private sector. .. ."-51 Further, "quantifiable measures of costs and
benefits" as well as "qualitative measures that are difficult to quantify
52
were to be evaluated.
Under Gorton's amendment, economic considerations would not
be considered in the actual listing process.53 However, once a final
listing decision was made, the Secretary would convene a planning
and assessment team to review the biological, economic, and intergovernmental impacts of the listing decision.5 4 Under current law, the
Secretary must provide for the full recovery of a species once it is
listed.55 Gorton's bill would have changed this by providing the Secretary with a range of options, including the option not to seek recovery
56
if it were not cost-beneficial.
Environmentalists saw the Gorton bill "as an effort to gut the Endangered Species Act" for the benefit of industry. 57 Indeed, the National ESA Reform Coalition and the Endangered Species
Coordinating Council, lobbies whose members included many industries that would have been most affected by its outcome, drafted the
45 See Government & Commerce: Endangered Species Ac, supra note 43, at 2641.
46 See Egan, supra note 42, at A20.
47 Endangered Species Act Reform Act of 1995, S. 768, 104th Cong. § 309 (1995).

48 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b) (1994).
49 S. 768.
50 141 CONG. REC. S7611 (daily ed. May 26, 1995) (statement of Sen. Craig).
51 S.768.
52 Id. § 309(5) (A) (iii) (II).
53 See 141 CoNG. REC. S6339, S6340 (daily ed. May 9, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Gorton).
54 See id.
55 See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d) (1994).
56 See 141 CONG. RE. S6339, S6340 (daily ed. May 9, 1995) (statement of Sen.

Gorton).
57

Government & Commere Endangered Species Act, supra note 43, at 2641.
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proposed amendment. 58 However, the bill, referred to the Senate
Committee on Environment and Public Works, did not even have the
support to make it out of committee.5 9 Thus, the Senate never voted
on Senate Bill 768 during the 104th session, and Gorton did not reintroduce an ESA re-authorization bill in the 105th Congress. However,
the Rebecca principles embodied in the proposal and the possibility
of re-introduction remain. The bill's supporters and the history of the
bill's introduction also illuminate that political and economic interests, not necessarily more rational regulation, lie behind such a
change in policy.
Some CERCLA re-authorization proposals have also attempted to
utilize risk based cleanups and limitations on benefits to be considered instead of full protection of human health or the environment.
In October, 1995, Representative Mike Oxley (R-Ohio) introduced
House Bill 2500, Reform of Superfund Act of 1995 (ROSA), in an
attempt to amend CERCLA. 60 The bill proposed that a form of risk
based corrective action, wherein costs are to be considered in determining whether and how to conduct CERCLA cleanups, be legislatively adopted for CERCLA. 6 1 Specifically, ROSA would have required
the EPA or a delegated state to give primary consideration to "costeffectiveness" and "cost-reasonableness" in remedy decisions. 62 This
emphasis on costs in the level of cleanup or level of health protection
is in stark contrast to current law, which provides that the EPA first
meet the goal of "protection of human health and the environment
63
before a remedial alternative is acceptable."
Even after utilizing benefits and costs in the remedy decision,
ROSA would have also required the EPA or a delegated state to conduct an additional strict benefit-cost analysis of any proposed remedial
64
action.
As characterized by its critics, ROSA "expressly limits protection
to the '90th percentile of exposure probability distribution,' in effect
designating the ill, the old, the previously exposed, and the nation's
58 See id. Members included Chevron, Kaiser Aluminum, the Idaho Power Company, and other companies that object to environmental restrictions on logging, mining, and other industrial activity. See id.
59 See Bill Tracking S 768, LEXIS, 1995 Bill Tracking S. 768.
60 Reform of Superfund Act of 1995 (ROSA), H.R. 2500, 104th Cong. (1995).
61 See id. § 102.
62 I&
63 JOHN S. APPLEGATE Er AL., THE REGULATION OF Toxic SUBSTANCES AND HAzARD.
ous WASTES 907 (2000).
64 See H.R. 2500 § 102.
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children as sacrifice populations." 65 Again, there was also some concern that the goal was not really cost-effectiveness or "rationality" but
the blocking of environmental enforcement. Some critics were concerned that with the combination of benefit-cost analysis and site-spe-

cific risk assessments, the length of time associated with the cleanup
process could be increased if the implementors of the program were
G6
forced into an excessive level of detail through the benefit-cost test.
While the bill was approved by the House Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and Hazardous Materials, further progress of the bill
was delayed by budgetary problems with costs of retroactive repeal.67
While not explicitly requiring a balancing of benefits and costs,
there have been other legislative proposals that have sought to quantify these numbers, and this may have the effect of reducing environmental protection, as compared to costs, by simply eliminating a
consideration of certain environmental values. On February 4, 1999,
Representative Richard Pombo (R-California) introduced a bill that
would require independent peer review of scientific data used in support of all federal regulations. 6s The Science Integrity Act, House Bill
574, also calls for federal agencies to have an independent peer review
process in place byJanuary 1, 2001.69 Review panels would consist of

at least two, but not more than five, outside experts selected by "the
head of each Federal department or agency which issues or may issue
regulations supported by scientific data."7 0 The bill specifies certain
criteria that agency heads must follow in creating a list of individuals
that are qualified to perform peer review functions. 7 Further, a final

rule could not be issued until 30 days after Congress received "(1)
each peer review report; (2) all scientific data used in support of the
proposed regulation or requested by a peer reviewer; (3) the response
of the head of the department or agency to points of disagreement, if
any, among the peer reviewers; and (4) all public comments
received." 72
65 Reform of Superfund Act of 1995: Hearings on H.. 2500 Before the Subcomm. on
Commerce, Trade, and HazardousAfaterials, 104th Cong. 291 (1995) (statement of Frances Dunham, Citizens Against Toxic Exposure).
at 31 (statement ofJames Colman, Assistant Comm'r, Mass. Bureau of
66 See id.
Waste Site Cleanup).
67 See Superfund RetrRepealDropped, ENvn.. LABU.rr REP., Oct. 1, 1995, at 3.
68 Briefs, PESIcmE & Toxic CFzzincL NEwS, Feb. 18, 1999, 1999 WL 9623462.
69 Science Integrity Act, H.R. 574, 106th Cong. (1999); Briefs, supra note 68.
70 H.R 574 § (2)(a).
71 See id. § (2)(b)-(c).
72

Id.§ (2)(g)(1)-( 4 ).
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The purpose of the bill, according to one Pombo staffer, is to
make federal agencies accountable for the science on which they base
decisions in the same manner as scientists outside federal agencies. 73
However, critics claim that the Science Integrity Act would increase
the costs of developing new regulations by requiring agencies to pay
peer reviewers for their work and by providing another level of oversight that agency scientists would have to go through to issue regulations. 74 This, and similar provisions that have been pushed since the
104th Congress, 75 may not overtly require benefit-cost analysis, but the
effect is to force agencies to justify costs incurred by the regulated
community. In other words, the provisions create pressure to ensure
that all regulation costs are based on similarly severe, quantifiable
risks, as that term is understood by Congress. 76 Such regulatory
sleight of hand has been documented at the EPA,7 7 and to the extent

that more pressure is applied to the agency to generate such information, there is no reason to believe that such legislative proposals will
not encourage the expansion of such methods, particularly when the
78
standard of review of the agency's actions is so deferential.
House Bill 574 is substantially similar to House Bill 3234, a bill
introduced in the 105th Congress. 79 Representative Pombo introduced House Bill 3234 on February 12, 1998, and it was referred
jointly to the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight and
the Committee on Science.8 0 However, the bill never made it out of
committee and was not carried over to the following session.8 1 Thus,
Representative Pombo reintroduced this similar bill with hopes of
gaining more support in the 106th Congressional Session.8 2 Even if
this fails, it seems that the pressure to increase the use of this peer
review process means that similar proposals will continue for the foreseeable future.

73

House Bill Would Require EPA Science to be Peer Reviewed, INSIDE EPA, Feb. 19,

1999, at 13.
74

Id.

75

See Flatt, supra note 4, at 586 n.4.

76
77

See id. at 606-07.
See id. at 601.

78

See id. at 608 (providing citations).

79

See Brief Notes: Rep. Richard Pombo (R-Calif), FooD

CHEMICAL

NEWs, Feb. 23,

1998, 1998 WL 10981274.
80
81
82

Id.
See Bill Tracking H.R. 3234, LEXIS, 1998 Bill Tracking H.R. 3234.
See House Bill Would RequireEPA Science to be PeerReviewed, supranote 73, at 13.
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II. So WHAT IS WRONG wTH REBECCA? PROBLEMS WTH
THE PROCESS

A.

Problems with the Determinationof Relevant Environmental Values

The problems with Rebecca are manifold. First, with any type of
balancing of costs and benefits, there may be problems with the determination and/or calculation of the values themselves. These
problems are exacerbated in the environmental context because of
uncertainties and the attempts to control these uncertainties by limiting the consideration of important environmental values.ss Which
values are to be considered in such a system? The problem of input
consideration can arise even if an agency is not balancing health
against cost but simply comparing costs of alleviating the "same"
harm. In general, most of our current environmental programs recognize the importance and need of protecting the environment as
well as human health.8 4 However, when cost-based decisions designed
to lessen risk are utilized administratively, as in CERCIA for insfance,

the consideration is usually human risk,8 5 and this takes the focus off

of Congress's concern about other environmental harms. Although
CERCLA is usually classified as a statute designed to protect human
health, certain provisions suggest that remediation or cleanup is de-

signed to effectuate other purposes, such as restoring natural resources to their prior condition and protecting environmental health
generally.8 6 CERCLA's section 102 clearly indicates that the administrator may designate a substance as hazardous under the Act if it
presents substantial danger to the public health or welfare or the environment.87 Capping a field with concrete for industrial purposes may
protect human health as much as cleanup to pristine standards and
thus may be favored under an administrative use of Rebecca, but the
two remedies are clearly not identical in terms of environmental assistance. Many environmental values that are less tangible than protection of human health are dearly indicated in our environmental laws
and are important to many people.88 Introduction of wider benefit83 See, ag., Science Integrity Act, H.R. 574, 106th Cong. (1999); supra notes 69-72
and accompanying text.
84 See Flatt, supra note 11, at 1719-20.
85 See Wyeth, supra note 24, at 10,358.
86 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9602(a), 9607(a) (4) (C) (1994).
87 42 U.S.C. § 9602(a) (1994).
88 See Victor B. Flat, The Human Environment of the Mind: CorretingAEPA Implementation by TreatingEnvironmentalPhilosophy and EnvironmentalRisk Allocation as Environmental Values Under NEPA, 46 HAsnrcs LJ. 85, 97-101 (1994) (providing
citations).
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cost analysis, either by a limitation of values to be considered or by
wholesale changes in risk balancing, Will clearly lessen or discard heretofore important environmental values.
B. Problems with Calculation of Values
Second, even if Rebecca proposals sought to explicitly preserve
these "important" environmental values, the uncertainties present in
quantifying these benefits and balancing them against costs would be
extremely difficult and likely would discount these important values.
Any attempt to balance costs of risks with benefits of controlling those
risks must face the harsh reality that risk assessment is an inexact science. The futility of objective assessment can be seen in the nature of
the term "risk" itself. As explained by Howard Kunreuther and Paul
Slovic:
The dominant conception views risk as "the chance of injury, damage, or loss." The probabilities and consequences of adverse events
are assumed to be produced by physical and natural processes in
ways that can be objectively quantified by risk assessment. Much
social science analysis rejects this notion, arguing instead that risk is
inherently subjective. In this view, risk does not exist "out there,"
independent of our minds and cultures, waiting to be measured.
Instead, human beings have invented the concept [of] risk to help
them understand and cope with the dangers and uncertainties of
life. Although these dangers are real, there is no such thing as "real
risk" or "objective risk." The nuclear engineer's probabilistic risk
estimate for a nuclear accident or the toxicologist's quantitative estimate of a chemical's carcinogenic risk are both based on theoretical
models, whose structure is subjective and assumption-laden, and
whose inputs are dependent onjudgment.... [NIonscientists have
their own models, assumptions, and subjective assessment techniques (intuitive risk assessments), which are sometimes very differ89
ent from the scientists' models.
Even among "objective" scientists there is disagreement. There
are often different risk assessments given on the same data, depending on for whom the risk assessor is working.9 0 The EPA's problems
with this inexact science are exacerbated by the fact that the EPA has
poor data quality to begin with and therefore starts any potential risk
89 Howard Kunreuther & Paul Slovic, Science, Values, and Risk, 545 ANNALS Ai.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. Sci. 116, 119 (1996) (citations omitted).
90 See JOHN A. HiND, SUPERFUND: THE PoxricAL EcoNoMv OF ENVIRONMENTAL
RISK 52 (1994).
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assessment at a disadvantage.9 1 As stated by Michael Gerrard in his
review of books examining risk assessment:
A total of about fifty steps have been counted in the conduct of a
risk assessment; each is full of uncertainty and susceptible to challenge. When it is all added up, the range of uncertainty is so great
that it is like not knowing whether you have enough money to buy a
°2
cup of coffee or enough to pay off the national debt,
With respect to the ESA, in which Rebecca-type changes have
been proposed, much "hard" data is extremely uncertain. As noted by
Holly Doremus in her insightful article examining the use of scientific
data in ESA listing decisions, data gathering must be supplemented by
experimental manipulation of the data in order to confirm or reject
theories of species survival and preservation.9 3 However, with respect
to doing experiments on real animal populations in the real environment, field experiments "are often expensive and fraught with practical difficulties." 94 Doremus explains some other difficulties of field
experiments:
They also might be precluded by ethical considerations; it might be
illegal or immoral to introduce a pathogen to an island ecosystem.
Even if ethically permissible, field experiments often produce less
reliable data than laboratory experiments because the field experimenter cannot hope to control all of the many variables ....
... [A]U data is to some degree equivocal. Obserwations of the
natural world are an unavoidably messy business.9 5
With such difficulty come calls for discounting these environmental values, which is similar to the problem identified earlier of failing
to acknowledge certain environmental values at all. As the EPA has
moved to demonstrate the necessity of regulation by producing benefit-cost justifications for regulations, cries of "poor science" are going
up. According to Inside EPA, there are concerns that the agency is
going to "set a dangerous precedent [in its first ever cost-benefit calculation for a rule under the Safe Drinking Water Act] by overestimating
91 See GAO BlastsEPA DataManagement inFace ofProposedReforms LNsIE EPAJan.
29, 1999, at 13-14.
92 Michael B. Gerrard, Demons and Angds in HazardousIVaste Regulation:AreJustice,
Efficiency, and Democracy Recondlable?, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 706, 729-30 (1998) (citations
omitted).

93 Holly Doremus, Listing Decisions Under the Endangered Specdes Ad: 174y Beter Sdence Isn't Always BetterPolicy, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 1029, 1059 (1997).
94 Id. at 1060.
95 Id. at 1060, 1068 (citations omitted).
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the health and environmental benefits of the rule."9 6 Congress is also
investigating allegations that the EPA engaged in manipulating scien97
tific information to support pre-determined regulatory safety levels.
What these actions indicate is that, with such scientific uncertainty, the supposed gains from requiring "objective" analysis are simply subsumed in the policy decision that the decision-maker wishes to
pursue through its selection of various "competing" risk assessment
assumptions and models. 98 Indeed, this may be one of the main reasons behind the popularization of Rebecca recently. As noted by
David Wirth and Ellen Silbergeld, pending legislative proposals quite
obviously would exacerbate the less desirable aspects of the current
system rather than ameliorate them. "In context, it is difficult to characterize the use of risk assessment in the legislative vehicles currently
proposed as anything other than an abuse of that methodology, designed not to promote regulatory reform but to impede desirable or
necessary regulatory activity." 9 9
Even without any overt political biases, it is doubtful if data free
from perspective is even possible. As noted by Doremus, "Where reasonably possible, scientists tend to interpret their observations as consistent with whatever theory currently commands the most adherents,
even if other interpretations are equally or even more plausible." 10 0
C.

Problems with Limitations on Public Review and Input

A third problem, which is itself not technical, but is the result of
the technical complexities of attempting a risk based cost balancing, is
that the many layers of risk assessment and scientific review required
for such decisions make the resulting decision more inaccessible to
the general public. 1 1 Formal risk assessments, buried as they are
under statistics, are often difficult for the public to understand. In96 EPA Charged With OverstatingBenefits in FirstDrinking Water Rule Analysis, INsIDE
EPA, Feb. 19, 1999, at 13.
97 See CongressionalCommittees to InvestigateEPA Science Practices,INSIDE EPA, Feb. 5,
1999, at 4.
98 See Flatt, supra note 4, at 606.
99 David A. Wirth & Ellen K. Silbergeld, Risky Reform, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1857,
1895 (1995) (book review); see also Flatt, supra note 4, at 607 (arguing that the EPA's
utilization of its own values in benefit-cost analysis would minimize the impact of the
proposed "Contract with America").
100 Doremus, supra note 93, at 1066.
101 See Robert W. Collin & Robin Morris Collin, The Role of Communities in Environmental Decisions: Communities Speakingfor Themselves, 13 J. ENvTL. L. & LrTic. 37, 78-79
(1998); Nancy Perkins Spyke, PublicParticipationin EnvironmentalDecisionmakingat the
New Millenium: StructuringNew Spheres of Public Influence, 26 B.C. ErrvL. Arr. L. REv.
263, 270, 293 (1999).
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deed, even supporters of Rebecca contend that the public is underinformed about risk, indicating a need for greater public involvement
10 2
and understanding.
This is a grave problem. The increasing opacity that would result
from these additional, scientific review layers flies in the face of requirements for administrative decision making. Administrative agencies are not directly elected and thus not immediately responsible to
the electorate. Public participation is critical in the administrative
10 3
process as a way to make modem regulation democratic.
In such a situation, only the wealthy and empowered can make
arguments based on science. This allows the EPA to make decisions
without effective review from all sectors of the public. However, as
many of the environmental statutes make clear, the EPA's job is to
l0 4
protect all of the public.
III.

PROBLEMS WrrH THE CONCEPT ITSELF

While the foregoing problems with Rebecca are themselves
enough to call into question its use in a broad administrative or legislative sense, at least many of these issues of concern, such as the legality of administrative actions and problems with data, have been
examined or are generally understood in other contexts. 03i What has
yet to be fully explored, with respect to implementation of a pure risk
based decision paradigm for environmental decisions generally, is the
effect that such proposals will have on society's entitlements to a clean

environment and the abandonment of the driving policy in American
common law and historic legislation that private actors should not be
allowed to shift their costs or harms upon innocent third parties.
102 See BREVER, supra note 6, at 20-21.
103 See Spyke, supra note 101, at 267.
104 See Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(3) (1994) ("M[T]he primary purpose of this chapter [is] to assure that... such chemical substances and
mixtures do not present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment."); 42 U.S.C. § 500-g-l (b) (3) (A) (1994) ("Ihe
contarnmnt [must be regulated if it] may have an adverse effect on the health of persons."); see also 33 U.S.C.
§ 1312(a) (1994) (establishing effluent limitations to maintain water quality to protect the public); 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a) (1994) (providing for development and publication of criteria to protect water quality for public water supplies, wildlife, and
recreational activities); 42 U.S.C. § 6902(a)-(b) (1994) (establishing hazardous waste
provisons to protect the public); 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b) (1994) (authorizing regulation
of hazardous substances that present substantial danger to the public health and welfare); 42 U.S.C. § 9602(a) (1994) (stating the statute's purpose "to promote public
health and welfare").
105 See generaly Flatt, supra note 88 (promoting a NEPA analysis that focuses on
environmental philosophy and environmental values).
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The use of risk based assessments to make regulatory determinations fails to account for the critical element of the allocation of those
risks and benefits. 106 As stated in a previous article, many of our environmental laws impose costs upon polluting parties not because these
cost impositions are necessarily "economically efficient," but because
these parties are the "cause" of the harm. 10 7 A wholesale reform of
administrative decisions through legislation or covert administrative
action to simply balance risks with costs (Rebecca) in pollution abatement would represent a retreat from the tried and true policy of forcing the actor to bear the costs of his or her harm or, in the
environmental context, the "polluter pays" principle.10 8 Although this
policy decision is not necessarily off limits to our society, it should be
entered into thoughtfully and not as merely an adjunct to creating
more efficient administrative decisions.
What is most damning of Rebecca in this context is its divergence
from our principles of historic common law and, indeed, our dedication to individual liberty. Before, when we had a problem tracing
costs to private parties who had benefited from the harm of others,
particularly when that harm was by choice, it was seen as a common
law failure to be corrected by legislation. 10 9 Rebecca would turn this
correction of the common law on its head and create a safe harbor for
defendants that has never existed at common law.

A general examination of the historic common law of compensa-

tion does not provide justification for Rebecca principles in our environmental laws. The predominant model of civil liability in the
common law of torts is negligence." 0 Though there appears to be

some superficial similarities between Rebecca and the economicjusti106

See Flatt, supra note 11, at 1716.

107 See id.
108 See Michael J. Gergen, The Failed Promise of the "PolluterPays" Principle: An Economic Analysis of LandownerLiabilityfor Hazardous Waste, 69 N.Y.U. L. Rv. 624, 627-28

(1994) ("[G]ommon law liability rules are consistent with a popular adage among
environmental economists and legal scholars which asserts that the polluter should
bear direct responsibility for the cost of the pollution she imposes on the rest of society-the 'polluter pays' principle."); see alsoJohn R.E. Bliese, Conservative Principles
and EnvironmentalPolicies,7 KAN.J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y, Spring 1998, at 1, 26-27 (discussing the "polluter pays" principle as a means by which the negative externalities involved in production and consumption are internalized in the market price of the
product); Susan R. Poulter, Cleanup and Restoration:Who Should Pay?, 13J. LAND UsE &
ENvrL. L. 77, 85 n.47 (1998) ("Polluters must live by this simple rule: If you pollute
our environment, you should pay to clean it up." (quoting President Clinton, 1997
State of the Union address)).
109 See Flatt, supra note 11, at 1716.
110

RxcHARD

A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIAL ON TORTS

115 (6th ed. 1995).
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fication sometimes put forward for the boundaries of negligence liability, a closer look shows this comparison to be flawed.
First, it should be recognized that the negligence standard is not
Fairness is
designed exclusively to promote economic efficiency.'
also a traditional justification for our common law of torts.1n 2 Though
negligence may occasionally lead to unfair results, generally, the failure to hold defendants liable can be justified on the fairness ground
that precautions that the defendant could have taken to avoid the
harm were not reasonable and that it would thus be unfair to penalize
defendants without fault." 3 No such assertions of "fairness" can be
made about Rebecca. While certain narrow analyses of cost efficiency
may suggest that a defendant should not clean up her own mess or, as
suggested byjustice Breyer, should not clean up the "last ten percent"
of the mess," 4 this can hardly be justified by any claim of fairness. We
rarely consider it fair to let parties cause harm to other parties, because the first parties would receive some benefit. To paraphrase Lisa
Heinzerling- we do not let one person shoot another, because the
shooter might enjoy it a lot!1 And though economists have struggled mightily to explain the difference between this concept and the
concept of letting known, purposeful risks fall on innocent parties, all
evidence indicates that allowing environmental harms to knowingly
fall on innocent victims is just as egregious and just as unfair as the
former situation. As stated by Kai Erikson in A New Species of Trouble:
Explorations in Disaster, Trauma, and Community.
People who are victimized by [environmental harms] feel a special
measure of distress when they come to think that their affliction was
caused by other human beings. And that sense of injury becomes
all the sharper and more damaging when those other human beings
respond to the crisis with what is seen as indifference or denial.'Ir
Moreover, the rallying cry of so-called economic efficiency in Rebecca regulation is not the same as the economic efficiency that is said
to be at the heart of the common law of negligence, precisely because
the economic efficiency of negligence does not seek to leave burdens
on a plaintiff placed there purposefully for the enrichment of a defenIII See KENN= S. ABRAHAM, THE FoRNis AND FuNCTIONS OF TORT Lwv 64 (1997)
("There are, of course, other values worth promoting besides economic efficiency.").
112 See id.
113 EPSTEIN, supra note 110, at 155.
114 BRYER, supra note 6, at 11-12.
115 Lisa Heinzerling, The Rights of StatisticalPeople, 24 HRv. EnV.
189 (2000).

L RL,. 189,

116 KAI ERIKSON, A Nuv SPECIES OF TROUBLE: EXPLORATIONS IN Dlmsmu
AND CozimrNr 129 (1994).
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dant. Judge Posner's respected writings on the common law of torts
have indeed suggested that decisions in the common law of negligence can be explained by showing that the common law systematically allows the harm to fall on the person who can avoid that harm at
least cost, thus increasing society's overall wealth and economic efficiency by not requiring precautions by a defendant when the precaution is more expensive than the probability of loss times the
magnitude of that loss. 117 Indeed, this principle is even stated as a

formula, introduced by Judge Learned Hand, for determining
whether certain actions on the part of a defendant are reasonable and
therefore immune from negligence liability."18
However, the simplistic application of this "economic efficiency"

to environmental cleanups and protections proposed under Rebecca
fails to account for half of the equation. For instance, the Rebecca
application to CERCLA cleanup processes only examines economic
efficiency after the creation of the harm. Rebecca has not been proposed, nor justified, on the theory that it was more expensive for the
polluter to control the original disposal of the pollutant than to simply let it be a health hazard to the public. Presumably, relatively simple precautions such as disposal in non-leaching landfills, as required
by the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976,119 would be
cheaper than the wholesale harm that can result from human exposure to uncontrolled toxins.
Common law does not recognize ex ante economic efficiency as
its primary goal. If it did, we would never compensate the plaintiff for
loss, since the mere transfer of assets from the defendant to the plaintiff would be more inefficient to society as a whole than simply letting
the plaintiff bear the burden of the loss. In such a case, after the
harm has already occurred, it almost always would be better for society
to allow the plaintiff to bear his or her own costs due to the cost of
12 0
money transfers, the cost of proof, and other transaction costs.

Clearly with respect to that one transaction, society as a whole would
be better off if the loss were born by the plaintiff because total wealth
117
118

See Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 32-33 (1972).
See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947)

(Hand, J.) ("Possibly it serves to bring this notion into relief to state it in algebraic
terms: if the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability depends
upon whether B is less than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B is < PL.").
119 See 42 U.S.C. § 6924(o) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
120 As stated by Justice Holmes, the allocation of tort responsibility based on fault
is a "cumbrous and expensive machinery." HoLMEs, supra note 16, at 96. However,
we avail ourselves of this shift of cost because there is "some clear benefit... to be
derived from disturbing the status quo." Id.
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would increase. However, our law of negligence rejects this theory.
This rejection is not only due to fairness, but also classical economic
theory, as it would provide an incorrect incentive to avoid precautionary approaches when that would be cheaper than post-event compen-

sation. But this same justification could apply to preventing the
adoption of Rebecca policies as well. By allowing parties to escape
liability for harm simply because the remediation of that harm is more
costly than doing nothing, one encourages these parties not to take

the proper cost-effective precautions to control the harm before it occurs. 2 1 Laws such as GERCLA or underground storage tank laws are

consistent with the economic underpinnings of negligence in that
they encourage cheaper pro-active behavior rather than after-the-fact
correction. Even in our modem society, an ounce of prevention is
still worth a pound of cure. The failure to heed that advice should not
result in the perpetrator getting to throw the pound of loss onto
another.
Moreover, under the classical Coase theorem of the common law,
entitlement allocation under the common law would only be economically rational if it helped reduce transaction costs by letting the entitlement rest at the point of wealth maximization. 2 2- Indeed, our
whole notion of fairness may grow out of this simple common sense
notion. From the Coase viewpoint, any allocation of entitlements that
follows from the application of the Learned Hand, or economic efficiency, theory of negligence must be justified because transaction
costs are not zero, and the entitlements should thus be placed to allow
the lowest cost of bargaining. 23 This in turn will result in economic
efficiency. Or to state it in Learned Hand's terms: negligence allows
the defendant to avoid taking precautions that might lead to plaintiff
harm if the plaintiff can more efficiently avoid or weather that
24
harm.1
Yet this justification does not exist for the application of Rebecca
in the environmental context. In most environmental situations,
121 This is also one reason why using a modified version of Rebecca, wherein some
control costs (up to the level of protective benefit) are still charged to the defendant,
is not any better. Although the defendant may spend some money on the clean-up,
the possibility of escaping liability altogether and the uncertainty of the liability
amount would again not provide enough incentive to push the defendant into taking
cost-effective precautions.
122 Brenda Greenberg Bryn, Refusals to Cross Stranger Pidet Lines and the Walth
Maximiation Prindpie.An Economic Analysis ofthe Views of the NLRB andJudgePosner,41
U. MTiAn L. REV. 533, 542 (1987).
123 Id.
124 See EpSrEIN, supra note 110, at 205.
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plaintiffs have no real control over their level of exposure, and throwing the burden of precaution on them would neither prevent the
harm nor allow them to determine the appropriate level of harm
avoidance. Thus, the defendant cannot use economic efficiency to

justify requiring the plaintiff to bear the imposed environmental harm
simply because the cost of precaution is higher than the cost of harm;
economic efficiency would exist simply by requiring the defendant to
pay the cost of the harm to the plaintiff in lieu of the cost of
12 5
precaution.
Taking a step back from negligence and looking at it in the context of the evolution of tort laws over the centuries brings the importance of the preservation of the plaintiffs' entitlements into sharp
relief throughout our common law of harm compensation. The shift
in the nineteenth century from a system of predominant strict liability
to one of negligence is one of the watersheds of tort law.' 26 It worked
a major change in how injury losses would be allocated. 12 7 However,
this change, revolutionary though it seems, still did not change the
ultimate allocation of responsibility in law or the entitlement to be
free from externally imposed harm and provides no justification now
for moving to risk based administration. According to the Restatement
(Third) of Torts, the reasonable person standard in negligence is
strongly predicated on forseeability, not economic feasibility. 128 The
so-called balancing test only comes into play to question what the defendant should have endeavored to learn-not what the defendant
129
already knew.
Applying this reasoning to the environmental context strongly
discourages the adoption of Rebecca. Most of the parties regulated

under the environmental laws are business entities who have profited
from their actions. The production of pollution, or the potential danger of that poliution, may not have been regulated by the law at one
time, but that does not indicate that the harms from these wastes were
not foreseeable, that containing their risks was not manageable, or
that their release was not similar to a breach of duty at common law.
Indeed, the extent that negligence does not countenance such risk
shifting may show why overall economic efficiency is not the sole, ulti-

125 Id. at 201-02.
126 See id. at 52.
127 See id.
128 See REsTATEMENT
file with the author).
129 See id.

(THIRD) OF TORTS

§ 48 (Discussion Draft, Apr. 5, 1999) (on
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mate goal of negligence and why reasonablebehavior in negligence is
not necessarily the same as rationaleconomic behavior.1'0

This distinction is illustrated by a close examination of the history
of torts, which indicates that the shift from strict liability to negligence

as the predominant theory of tort compensation really was only to assist in the efficiency of allocation based on proof, not "economic efficiency" as that term is used in benefit-cost analysis. As harms grew
more remote from their causes, there were simply some actions that
were impossible to prevent, some harms that were impossible to allocate, or some cases in which determining appropriate levels of precaution was simply economically prohibitive. The economic efficiency
justification of negligence thus goes only to the reasonableness of the
precautions, not to any choice to allow harm to be inflicted knowingly
on the plaintiff.
Historically, a form of strict liability governed allocation of
losses.1 31 At that time, the form of the case dictated the standard by
which liability attached to actions. The general writ for a tortious
harm was "trespass," which alleged that the defendant caused a direct
and traceable harm to the plaintiff.I3 2 It was well settled that the defendant should compensate the plaintiff for any harm caused by the
defendant. It was only later, when more complex cases could not allege an immediate and direct harm, that the concept of negligence
(or indirect harm) arose in the "trespass on the case." 33
However, the rise of "trespass on the case" was not linked with any
new theory regarding fault or the policies of liability or even a restric-

tion on the liability of the defendant. Instead, it worked an expansion
in the protection of plaintiffs by creating a way to compensate insituations in which the "trespass" pleadings "could by no extension of their
ordinary meanings apply." 3 4 The kind of cases requiring the "trespass on the case" pleading continued to grow as commerce and transportation (with its attendant harms) increased.'5 5
Thus, the emergence of negligence did not deprive potential
plaintiffs of legal entitlements that they already enjoyed. The emergence of negligence increased the universe of potential defendant liability from the historical case, wherein a direct harm and force was
alleged, to the doctrine that a defendant's inaction or removed action
130
tation,
131
132
133
134
135

See Robert L.Rabin, The Historcal Dedopmnent of the FaultPdndiple:A Rdnterpre15 GA. L. REV. 925, 959-60 (1981).
See EpsrEN, supra note 110, at 93, 97.
See id. at 104-05.
See id.
Id. at 105.
See id.
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could make that defendant liable.' 3 6 Indeed, it has been stated that,
far from a retreat from absolute liability, the emergence of negligence
is part of a long line of cases that increase or advance liability and
increasingly protect the plaintiff.13 7 Under this theory, when we examine the removal of barriers to sue and the temperance of strict defenses to tort liability, we as a society have been increasing each
individual's entitlement to protection of her own health or well
33
being.'
The doctrine of traditional strict .liability, therefore, is not one
that is alien to the notion of negligence, but one that gave rise to the
concept of negligence. Negligence, although appearing to create a
fault-based scheme in derogation of strict liability, should instead be
seen as a system that deals with the increasing complexity of tracing
harms in a more technical and complex society. Thus, the emergence
of negligence did not really change the proposition that a party is
responsible for the harm that he or she causes.
This recognition of complexities in tracing harms and faults has
its counterpart in modem environmental law. The Clean Air Act recognizes that hazardous air pollutants must be governed by technology
standards rather than through a complete elimination of risk, 139 and
other environmental laws allow technological standards in a nod to
the realities of regulation. 140 But this is not an unrestricted license to
harm human health up to a cost-beneficial level.
Negligence is thus an innovation in compensation that in no way

should be interpreted as allowing plaintiffs to involuntarily lose entitlements to their interests in health and well being. Indeed, when it
appears that an unthinking application of negligence law would do
such a thing, its strict application has been modified to support a
41
scheme more akin to strict liability.'
136 See id. at 114.
137 See Rabin, supra note 130, at 959-60.
138 See id.
139 See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d) (1994).
140 See generally 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (establishing the technical requirements for "end of pipe" control though water quality is still taken into
consideration); 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (1994) (new source performance standards); 42
U.S.C. § 7521 (1994) (mobile source standards); 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d) (1994) (technological controls of hazardous air pollutants).
141 See Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 647 F. Supp. 303, 313 (W.D. Tenn. 1986)
("The defendant's enterprise ... is required to pay its way by compensating for the
harm it causes because of its special, abnormal and dangerous character." (quoting
RESrATEmENT (SEcoND) oF TORTS § 519 cmt. d (1977))); Smith v. State, 222 S.E.2d
412, 419 (N.C. 1976) ("[S]ince the public purpose involves injury-producing activity,
injuries should be viewed as an activity cost which must be met in the furtherance of
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The modem line between negligence and strict liability illustrates
this principle well and further demonstrates why Rebecca is an unprecedented departure from our common law. The kind of shift in
entitlements suggested by Rebecca is the very type of "liability balancing" that has been explicitly rejected in the modem line of cases that
establish strict liability. These cases maintain the plaintiff's entitlement to be free from harm imposed by some external choice or cho142
sen action regardless of the cost of prevention to the defendant.
An obvious comparison is to the tort of nuisance, which imposes
liability on a defendant for interfering with the plaintiff's reasonable
use and enjoyment of land, irrespective of fault or cost.I 4 3 Despite the
attempts over time to assault this theory with arguments regarding economic efficiency and high abatement costs to the defendant, the

doctrine remains firm and essentially unchanged. 144 In Ensign v.
Walls, 45 the Michigan Supreme Court enjoined a nuisance even
though it existed prior to the plaintiff; and thus would, under economic efficiency, presumably be allowed to continue because of prior
sunk costs. 46 Thus, even in cases in which activities were perfectly
legal at one time, they can still be enjoined to protect the plaintiff's
right to be free from hazards. Indeed, both before and after the passage of CERCLA, hazardous waste sites have been held to be nuisances
14 7
without reference to their economic efficiency or benefit.

Even in the rare cases in which courts have refused to enjoin a
nuisance based on the economic hardship of doing so, the courts have
still recognized the plaintiff's right of entitlement to be free from the
nuisance. In the famous case of Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co.,14 3 the
New York Court of Appeals refused to award an injunction to close a
private nuisance but did award the plaintiffs damages based on their
right to be free from the nuisance. 149 The court noted that thejudgpublic enterprise."). See generally George L Priest, The Invention of EnlerpriseLiability:
A CriticalHistory of the IntellectualFoundationsofModem Tort Law, 14J. Lc,.L STUD. 461
(1985) (describing the origins, evolution, and applications of the theory of enterprise
liability).
142 See cases cited supra note 141.
143 See EpsrEIN, supra note 110, at 688.
144 See id.
145 34 NAV.2d 549 (Mich. 1948).
146 See id.
147 See Vill. of Wilsonville v. SCA Serv., Inc., 426 N.E.2d 824 (Ill. 1981); State v.
Fermenta ASC Corp., 608 N.Y.S.2d 980, 985 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) ("[R]elease or
threat of release of hazardous wastes into the enironment is a public nuisance" ithout evidence of fault.).
148 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970).
149

See id at 873.
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ment would "fully redress" the plaintiffs. 150 According to this court,
the damages award was not in opposition to the prior historic rulings
that required the granting of an injunction in cases where substantial
damage had been found.' 5 1 This is in marked contrast to the use of
Rebecca that does not simply compare the efficiencies of various complete remedies, but instead balances the proposed remedy against no
remedy for plaintiffs at all-in other words, a taking away of the victim's entitlement to be free from harm or at least to be compensated
for that harm.
More explicit reasoning against the imposition of Rebecca can be
seen in the common law of strict liability for ultra-hazardous activities.
Most jurisdictions recognize that where an injury is caused by an abnormally dangerous or ultra-hazardous activity of the defendants, ab-

solute or strict liability may be imposed. 5 2 The origin of this concept
of absolute or strict liability is found in an English case decided in
1868, Rylands v. Fletcher.153 This doctrine, enunciated by Justice Blackburn in the lower court's opinion, specifies
that the person who for his own purposes brings on his lands, and
collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes,
must keep it in at his peril, and, if he does not do so, is prima facie
answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of
4
its escape.'

5

However, on appeal to the House of Lords, Lord Cairns introduced
15 5
the idea that a "non-natural" use of land could result in liability.
Lord Cairns indicated that he "entirely concur[red]" with Justice
Blackburn, but his reasoning was more narrow. 15 6 He concluded that
the rule of absolute liability applied where a "non-natural" use was
introduced onto the land. 5 7 According to Lord Cairns, "If in conse150 Id.
151 See id. at 874.
152 See 57A Amt. JUR. 2D Negligence § 396 (1989). Absolute liability has been imposed in cases in which an injury is caused by blasting or by the storage of explosives,
by trespassing livestock, by the keeping of wild or dangerous animals, by poisons used
for the destruction of vermin or for agricultural purposes, or by the use of exceptionally powerful instrumentalities which by their nature cause harm to persons or prop

erty over a wide area. See id. § 398.
153 3 L.R.-E. & I. App. 330 (H.L. 1868).
154 Fletcher v. Rylands, 1 L.R.-Ex. 265, 279 (1866).
155 J.W. Looney, Rylands v. Fletcher Revisited: A Comparison of English, Australian
and American Approaches to Common Law Liabilityfor DangerousAgriculturalActivities, I

DavaEJ. Aciuc. L. 149, 154 (1996) (quoting Rylands, 3 L.R.-E. & I. App. at 339).
156 Id. (quoting Rylands, 3 L.R.-E. & I. App. at 340).
157 Rylands, 3 L.R.-E. & I. App. at 339-40.

2001]

RISK BASED CORRECTIVE ACTION

quence of such a use there was an escape onto the land of others,
liability would follow."15 8
In Rylands, the defendants constructed a reservoir on land sepa-

rated from the plaintiffs land by intervening land.15 9 Coal had been
mined under the site of the reservoir and under part of the intervening land. 60 Further, the plaintiff had opened an underground "communication" between his own land and the old coal mines under the
reservoir. 1 1 Neither the defendants nor the persons employed by
them in the construction of the reservoir' 6 2 were aware that such communication existed or that there were any old coal mines under the
site of the reservoir.163 When the reservoir was filled, the water burst
down these shafts and flowed by the underground communication
into the plaintiff's mines.'6
Of course, the adoption of Rylands is not universal. Some states
do not recognize the Rylands doctrine of strict liability, but the courts
in those jurisdictions often reach the same result by applying nuisance
law. 165 Even in those jurisdictions that recognize the Rylands doctrine, some courts limit its application to dangerous activities on the
land, as opposed to merely non-natural activities.1' 6 Another limitation on the application of the doctrine is that it has not always applied
to damage resulting from the construction and maintenance of ordinary buildings and erections next to the land of an adjacent owner 67
Finally, some courts hold that no liability exists where the escape of
the dangerous substance from the defendant's premises is due to the
plaintiff's own fault, an act of God, or acts of third parties that the
defendant had no reason to anticipate.'6
158 Looney, supra note 155, at 154 (citing Rylands, 3 LR.-E. & I. App. at 339).
159 62A AM. Jura 2D Premises Liability § 758 n.4 (1990).
160 Id.

161 Id.
162 Id. For purposes of the disposition of this case, it as determined that contractors may have been negligent in failing to warn of the underground shafts, but this
negligence was not attributed to the landowner. See Bohlen, supranote 2, at 298-99.
163 62AAn.Juam 2D Premises Liability § 758 n.4 (1990).
164 Id.
165 See Andrew Allen Lemmon, The DevdopingDodrineofRylands v. Fletcher: Hazardous Waste Remediation ContractorsBeware, 42 Loy. L RE. 287, 293 (1996); see also
Kennedy v. Brandenburg, 470 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. App. 1971) (rejecting the Rylands
doctrine, but reaching virtually the same result under nuisance law).
166 SeeJon G. Anderson, Comment, The Rylands v. Fletcher Docrine in America:
Abnormally Dangerous, Ultraluzardous,orAbsolute Nuisance?, 1978 Anz. ST. LJ. 99, 100
n.5.
167 See Ainsvorth v. Lakin, 62 N.E. 746, 746 (Mass. 1902).
168 See Brown v. Gessler, 230 P.2d 541 (Or. 1951) (holding that, under the rule,
the defendant was not liable for damages caused by the escape of uater from an exca-

[VOL- 76:i!

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW[

The Restatement (Second) of Torts recognizes a rule somewhat similar to the Rylands doctrine, making one liable without fault where the

activity is considered abnormally dangerous. 169 "Abnormally dangerous" activities are described as dangers that "arise from activities that
are in themselves unusual, or from unusual risks created by more
170
usual activities under particular circumstances."

The commonalities in the adoption of the Rylands doctrine and/
or the Restatement position militate against the use of Rebecca. Generally, American courts applying the Rylands doctrine do not require
that a defendant intended for the damage to occur or that the defen-

dant failed to follow a prescribed degree of care.

71

"It has often been

said that strict liability arises from conduct which is so far legitimate
that it ivill not be enjoined, but it will make the defendant liable when
it causes damage."'1 72 However, courts applying the doctrine do recog-

nize the culpability of choice. 173 When determining the comparative
fault of the parties, many courts hold that "the defendant acting for
his own profit or pleasure is more at fault than the innocent plaintiff
who has no part in the creation of the abnormal risk." 174 This theory
is often referred to as "enterprise liability."'175- The crux of this theory

is that the defendant's enterprise will be tolerated by the law, but the
costs of accidents resulting from the profit-making activity should be

treated as a cost of business to be borne by the defendant's enterprise.' 76 Thus, many courts apply Rylands, which clearly tells us where
the liability lies for such activities.
vation on his premises where he had not brought the water or caused it to be collected therein, but where the accumulation was due entirely to heavy rains).
169

170
171

See RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF TORTS § 519

(1977).

Id. § 520 cmL f.
See Peneschi v. Nat'l Steel Corp., 295 S.E.2d 1, 5 (W. Va. 1982).
172 Id. (quoting WILiIAM PROSSER, Lmv OF TORTS 495 n.35 (4th ed. 1971)).
173 See Penesch4 295 S.E.2d at 5.
174 Id. at 5-6; see also Smith v. State, 222 S.E.2d 412, 419 (N.C. 1976) (concluding
that taxpayers who profit from the government's injury-producing activity should bear
the cost of the tort liability, not the innocent victims).
175 See sources cited supra note 141.
176 See Mowrer v. Ashland Oil & Ref. Co., 518 F.2d 659, 662 (7th Cir. 1975); Ind.
Harbor Belt R.R. Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 662 F. Supp. 635, 639-40 (N.D. 111. 1987),
rev'd, 916 F.2d 1174 (7th Cir. 1990); see also Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 647 F.
Supp. 303, 313 (W.D. Tenn. 1986) ("Thejudicial rationalization seems to be that one
who conducts a highly dangerous activity should prepare in advance to bear the financial burden of harm proximately caused to others by such an activity." (quoting CLxt.
ENCE MORRIS & C. ROBERT MORRIS, JR., MORIS ON TORTS, ch. IX, at 231 (2d ed.
1980))); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 519 cmt. d (1977).
For an illustration of this concept, one could imagine the situation where
the defendant has elephants parachuting onto his farmland to entertain his
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What is instructive about the Rylands case and its progeny are the
commonalities concerning the defendant's profit and the choice of
the defendant in carrying out the activity. Indeed, the facts that the
defendant may profit from the dangerous activity and that a conscious
choice was made to pursue this activity are pivotal in applying this
notion of strict liability.177 These cases center not so much on unreasonably dangerous activities that were still useful and to be allowed,
but on the fact that these activities were also behavioral choices from
which the perpetrator usually gained some kind of profit.1 78
The re-emergence of strict liability in Rylands re-emphasizes the
entitlement of the plaintiff. It is thus further recognition that economic efficiency alone is not the goal of all tort law, but that the economic balancing in negligence is the result of either the plaintiff
being unable to efficiently avoid harm or the realities of the defendant's ability to avoid cost when faced with unknown factors. Where
family-in such a case he is acting for his own purposes, and is seeking a
profit or benefit while creating an abnormal risk; if the elephant should not
land on target but rather on the plaintiff's roof, the plaintiff would be confounded if he had to prove either a negligent pilot or a defective parachute;
that would be tantamount to asking about the negligence of the elephant.
57 Asi. Jun. 2D Negligence § 397 n.96 (1989) (citing Penesd, 295 S.E.2d at 6).
177 See EPSTEIN, supra note 110, at 131.
178 Courts have applied the Rylands doctrine of strict liability for a variety of "ab-

normally dangerous" or "ultrahazardous" activities in which the defendant engaged
for private purposes. See Am. Cyanamid,662 F. Supp. at 644 (concerning a toxic chem-

ical spill in a shipyard near a residential area); Opal %.Material Serv. Corp., 133
N.E.2d 733, 747 (11. App. Ct. 1956) (concerning the use of explosives in a denselypopulated residential area); Kelley v. R.G. Indus., 497 A.2d 1143, 1159 (Md. 1985)
(concerning the manufacture and sale of "Saturday night special" guns because they

were made specifically to kill people, although later repudiated by the Maryland legislature); Clark-Aiken Co. v. Cromwell-Wright Co., 323 N.E.2d 876, 887 (Mass. 1975)
(concerning the escape of water from the defendant's failed dam that he erected for
his own benefit); Peneschi, 295 S.E.2d at 5 (concerning accumulation and use of combustible gas for private purposes); Vaughan v. Miller Bros. "101" Ranch Wild West

Show, 153 S.E. 289, 290 (IV. Va. 1930) (concerning the keeping of an ape for a circus
act when the ape escaped and injured someone). However, courts have also refused
to extend the Rylands doctrine of strict liability to certain activities when the nature
and/or location of the activities does not render them "abnormally dangerous" or
"ultrahazardous." See Copier v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 138 F.3d 833, 836 & n.3 (10th
Cir. 1998) (holding that the manufacture of handguns is not an ultrahazardous activity for which strict liability applies, and noting otherjurisdictions that have refused to
extend the Rylands doctrine to the manufacture and sale of firearms); Heinrich v.
Sweet, 49 F. Supp. 2d 27, 42 (D. Mass. 1999) (refusing to apply the Rylands doctrine to
experimental surgeries); Walker Drug Co. v. La Sal Oil Co., 902 P.2d 1229, 1233
(Utah 1995) (refusing to apply strict liability to leakage of gasoline from a gas station
in an area of the city where gas stations were common and beneficial to the

community).
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the factors of precaution are known and in control of the defendant,
the Coase Theorem would predict that the entitlement need not be
shifted to the defendant. 179 Rylands follows this logic by taking away
the ability of negligence to award a defendant's considered choice to
take the plaintiff's entitlement, even where there is superficial economic feasibility. Thus, even where pre-occurrence precautions may
be more expensive than cumulative harm to plaintiff (something that
is not highly likely with environmental harms), Rylands recognizes
that negligence was not meant to be a way for one party to profit,
merely because the plaintiff's marginal cost of avoidance was lower
than the defendant's cost of precaution. Instead, it simply reasserts
the principle that people have a right to their own health and wellbeing and that this right is not to be taken in profit by another, simply
because it is more economically efficient at that point in time. Certainly, economists have explained the Rylands doctrine as merely another way to allocate costs rather than a drain on economic
efficiency, 80° but this reasoning would apply equally well to Rebecca.
If it is too expensive for an economic concern to fully contain or compensate for its risks, then it should not be engaging in those risks in
the first instance.' 8a This doctrine re-emphasizes that tort law is not a
system in which efficiency is the complete good, but one in which
fairness and rights to one's own health and well-being are the preeminent considerations.
Expanding risk based analysis to areas of human health or the
environment, such as hazardous waste or endangered species, would
eviscerate this principle. People or organizations would be able to
choose to undertake an activity for which part of the cost would fall
upon others, but these others would not have to be reimbursed-the
exact opposite of the holding in Rylands and a far cry from simply
stating that precautions do not have to be taken if they are unreasonable and/or not practical in the course of daily life. Indeed, where the
continuation of the Rylands doctrine has recently been challenged in
the United Kingdom and Australia, the support of the Rylands doc-

179 For discussion of Coase Theorem, see supra text accompanying notes 122-26.
180 EpsmN, supra note 110, at 349.
181 SeePowell v. Fall, 5 Q.B.D. 597, 601 (1880) ("[lf the reward which he gains for
the use of the machine will not pay for the damage, it is mischievous to the public and
ought to be suppressed, for the loss ought not to be borne by the community or the
injured person.").
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trine for preserving the plaintiff's entitlement in modem environmen18 2
tal laws has been explicitly recognized.
Interestingly, an examination of the environmental statutes shows
how similar they are to the operating principles of common law. For
instance, the only real difference between proving harm under CERCLA and the common law is the ease of establishing the prima facie
case. Traditional tort law was inadequate to compensate or deter hazardous waste exposures-not because such exposures were to be encouraged or allowed, but because the common law had not evolved to
compensate for issues of probabilistic causation. It was not that tort
law would not recognize that hazardous waste sites were a breach of
the duty of due care under a negligence standard,but that causation
under this negligence standard was difficult to prove.18 3 Thus, CERCLA is not an expansion of liability without regard to fault so much as
it is a way to bring "negligent" parties under the causation net. 84 It is
true that CERCIA is a so-called strict liability statute in that "fault"
does not have to be proven,1 85 but CERCLA is implemented in such a
fashion that costs may be paid and/or allocated with respect to fault
or wrongdoing. 18 6 This is not done in the statute itself, because it is
difficult to put the burden of allocating responsibility (which would
7
again require proof of a causation element) on the plaintiff.18

The major criticisms of these environmental statutes and their
lack of economic efficiency are in fact no different from a criticism of
the underlying common law principles themselves. In Imposing Individual Liability as a Legislative Policy Choice: Holmesian "Intuitions"and
Superfund Refonn, David Spence argues that CERCLA is wrong or "unfair" because it imposes strict and joint and several liability.'8 8 Although Spence notes that hazardous waste disposal has often been
characterized as ultra-hazardous, he claims, without explanation, that
CERCLA liability is "broader."18 9 In reality, CERCLA liability is predicated on "imminent endangerment," 90 which is not the standard normally seen at common law, but is similar to an "ultra-hazardous" risk.
182 SeeJohn C. O'Quinn, Note, Not-So-Strict Liabiliy: A Foresceabiliy Test for Rylands
v. Fletcher and Other Lessonsfrom Cambridge Water Co. v. Eastern Counties Leather

PLC, 24 HAiv. ENvr. L. REV. 287, 295 (2000).
183 See Bender, supra note 17, at 268.
184 See Flatt, supra note 11, at 1716.
185 See United States v. Monsanto Corp., 858 F.2d 160, 167 (4th Cir. 1988).
186 See id. at 173.
187 See United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1332-33 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
188 David B. Spence, ImposingIndividual Liabilt, as a Legislative Policy Choice:Holmsian "Intuitions"and Superfund Reform, 93 Nw. U. L REV. 389, 399-400 (1999).
189 Id.
190 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604, 9607 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
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Moreover, joint and several liability under CERCLA is no more problematic than it is for common law torts. In the common law of torts,
with multiple defendants, relatively innocent defendants may be saddled with 100% of the liability because, at common law, the relatively
innocent plaintiff is favored over the defendant. 19 1 This is no different from the CERCLA context, where it is difficult to see how the
"more" innocent defendant, who obeyed all relevant laws at the time
of disposal, is not more culpable than the potential victim of the hazardous waste exposure. After all, these are business entities that secured some profit by their actions. If strict and joint and several
liability are still valid policies at common law, what makes the "unfairness" imposed by these policies in CERCLA an effective argument for
bringing about a change in entitlements in similar environmental laws
under the guise of Rebecca? 1 92 Changing CERCLA or other environmental laws to require a benefit-cost analysis of risk in determining

remedy would not be a way of moving back to a scheme more akin to
negligence, but would be introducing a wholesale change in the entitlements of victims to be free from harm.
CONCLUSION

What has really happened over time? Have we become more sophisticated? Do we as a society really wish to change the way that we
allocate harm and view risk? I do not think so. What has happened is
that we have become more cynical and, at least in the EPA's (now a
mature agency) case, more captured by industry. Thus, it is simply
easier to go along with these new proposals about risk allocation that
seem to offer more "efficient" management and seem to be more justified under benefit-cost analysis than to really question what is at play
and what we may be giving up. One looks in vain to find any real
reason to change the underlying principles that we as a society have
developed about risk and the allocation of harm. Efficiency is good,
but the risk balancing proposed in Rebecca is not for efficiency but
for a change in our whole paradigm of risk and harm allocation developed in the common law. The drum-beat of benefit-cost analysis has
been playing for so long that we have forgotten the pre-eminence we
191 See RESTATEMENT (TnRD)OF ToRTS: APPORTIONMENT oF LmiuT § 15 cmt. a
(2000).
192 Some jurisdictions alleviate some of the burden ofjoint and several liability by
the doctrine of comparative negligence, which can relieve some or all of the risk that
one defendant will bear the loss of another, insolvent defendant. See id. § 188. But
even in such a case, the comparison is dissimilar since there generally is no "plaintiff"
culpability, which would give rise to the use of a comparative negligence policy. See
id.
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place on the ability of our citizens to protect their own lives. "We do
not... believe that so long as it is worth $10 million to one person to
see another person dead, and so long as current estimates of the Value
of human life are lower than $10 million, it is acceptable for the first
person to shoot and kill the second."19 3 At least not yet. But, in the
embrace of Rebecca, we are moving in that direction.
This is a big change. Rebecca would move us away from the "polluter pays" principle, which has governed our hazardous waste and
pollution laws since their inception, to a "we all pay for economic efficiency" rule. For the good of the State, Rebecca would ask one individual to give up her life or health for another, making a mockery of
our preservation of individual liberty. This is nothing less than a
wholesale change in legal entitlements.
In conclusion, Rebecca is not what it claims to be. It is not a
logical plan for allocating scarce resources. Instead, it is a wholesale
change in one of our most bedrock common laws-that the harming
party should compensate the victim when that is possible. No theory
of the common law of torts suggests that voluntary decisions to impose
controllable harms on innocent plaintiffs should not be redressable.
Indeed, the examination of the history of common law strikingly indicates that the opposite is true-that the common law has changed to
preserve the right to be free from this kind of arbitrary harm. As
stated by the commentator Francis Bohlen, this right to be free from
such arbitrary and unfairly imposed harm is "a very part of the inner
consciousness of the race." 194 We should not reject that consciousness
lightly.

193 Heinzerling, supra note 115, at 189.
194 See Bohlen, supra note 2, at 303.
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